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GETTYSBURG
PENNSYLVANIA
October 22, 1962

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Memorandum of Conversation with Director of Central Intelligence Agency. John McCone on October 21st and telephone conversation with the President on October 22nd:

On the evening of October 20th I received a telephone message through General Schulz from John McCone who asked me to meet him in Washington on the morning of the 21st, with the possibility that I would go with Mr. McCone to visit the President of the United States.

The subject of the conversation was the situation in Cuba with a complete briefing by intelligence officers on the site of Soviet missile development in that area. The build up of rocket sites in the island had been going on for a good many weeks and at first, as the President stated publicly, it was assumed that these sites were for defensive equipment only; notably surface to air defensive missiles. There is now incontrovertible evidence that the sites are being expanded in number and include sites and equipment for long-range missiles, apparently of at least 2,000 mile range. The preparation of the island as a potential defensive base is so obvious that the Government feels it must do something. Three plans have been proposed:

1. Destruction of the sites by conventional bombing.
2. Bombing conducted simultaneously with amphibious invasion of the island with overwhelming forces.
3. Blockade of the island together with any necessary steps taken in sequence to assure the evacuation of the island by the Russians. Incidentally, there are obviously now some thousands of so-called technicians for installation and operation of the rockets.

All the above information was received from Mr. McCone.

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E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-2.4

MR 77-148#24

By mmt Date 12/5/82

Box 10
Cuba

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(Memo of October 22, 1962)

This morning I had a call from the President who told me that the Government had decided to put into effect the third plan. He is to make a speech tonight by television to notify the country of this decision. I told him that I had already come to the conclusion that the first plan in my opinion would not be useful and would indeed be detrimental to our cause. I told him, as I had told Mr. McCone, that I was not in a position to make a choice between Plans two and three because I was not in possession of all the background on files and communications and international conversation that would give me the basis for making any selection. I did say, however, that whatever the Government decided to do they would have my support.

Dwight D. Eisenhower